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This critical review elaborates on the origin of impulsive actions and how these 
can be controlled. We focus in particular on the role of negative events. First, 
we outline how impulsive actions often originate from negative events that are 
(emotionally) appraised. A discrepancy between this current state and a desired 
goal state leads to action tendencies. The urgency of the resulting action depends 
on the importance of the goal and the size of the discrepancy. Second, we discuss 
how such impulsive actions can be regulated or controlled e.g. by biasing compe-
tition between different options, or by completely suppressing all motor output. 
Importantly, such control mechanisms might also depend on emotional factors. To 
reconcile these findings, we present a coherent theoretical framework, taking into 
account various cognitive, affective, and motivational mechanisms as well as con-
textual factors that play a crucial role in the origin and control of impulsive actions.
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Introduction
Impulsivity is a very broad and popular 
concept in folk psychology and many scien-
tific (sub)disciplines, including clinical and 
personality psychology, psychiatry, animal 
research, and neurosciences. The concept 
generally refers to a wide range of actions 
or behaviors “that are poorly conceived, 
prematurely expressed, unduly risky, or 
 inappropriate to the situation and that often 
result in undesirable outcomes” (Evenden, 
1999, p. 348). Impulsivity has been associ-
ated with many psychopathological disor-
ders and behavioral problems, including 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), conduct disorder, substance use 
and abuse, behavioral addictions (such as 
gambling and gaming disorders), antiso-
cial personality disorder, or bipolar  disorder 
(Berg, Latzman, Bliwise, & Lilienfeld, 2015). 
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that 
impulsivity is a multifaceted construct and 
that impulsive behaviors are modulated by a 
wide range of cognitive, affective, and moti-
vational processes. This critical review will 
focus on one facet of this construct, namely 
impulsive action. In the literature, impulsive 
action is typically associated with failures 
of response inhibition, or more broadly, 
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failures in executive (i.e. voluntary) control 
(e.g. Bari & Robbins, 2013). However, such 
control accounts have little to say about 
how impulsive actions originate in the first 
place. Furthermore, recent data (including a 
direct replication) seem to challenge some of 
the core assumptions of dominant control 
accounts. In this critical review, we will there-
fore discuss how impulsive actions might 
originate and how these can be controlled in 
different ways.
Facets of impulsivity
The construct of impulsivity generally refers 
either to a trait, which is (at least in humans) 
typically assessed with self-reported ques-
tionnaires, or to a state, which is typically 
assessed in laboratory tasks. Impulsivity as 
a trait refers to a relatively stable person-
ality characteristic that is influenced by 
learning, environment, and genetic factors 
(Bezdjian, Baker, & Tuvblad, 2011). Several 
questionnaires have been developed to 
assess impulsivity traits. A questionnaire 
(and accompanying framework) that became 
dominant in the last years is the UPPS 
Impulsive Behavior Scale. Based on a range of 
impulsivity scales and the Big Five question-
naire (Costa Jr & McCrae, 1992), Whiteside 
and Lynam (2001) identified four different 
facets of trait impulsivity, namely (1) Urgency 
(defined as the tendency to commit rash or 
regrettable actions as a result of intense 
negative affect), (2) lack of Perseverance 
(defined as the difficulty to remain focused 
on cognitively demanding or boring tasks), 
(3) lack of Premeditation (defined as the ten-
dency not to think and reflect on the conse-
quences of an act before engaging in that 
act) and (4) Sensation seeking (defined as 
the tendency to look for exciting and/or new 
activities). Cyders and Smith (2007, 2008) 
further fine-tuned this scale (UPPS-P), and 
argued that urgency itself consists of two 
subcomponents, namely ‘positive’ and ‘nega-
tive’ urgency, depending on the valence of 
the emotional states promoting impulsive 
behaviors. For example, drinking too much 
on alcohol after you obtained a major grant 
could be seen as positive urgency, whereas 
drinking too much because your paper got 
rejected, might be due to negative urgency. 
Of all UPPS-P subscales, negative urgency 
has arguably received the most attention 
because it correlates with a wide range of 
behavioral problems and psychopathologi-
cal symptoms (see Smith & Cyders, 2016 for 
a review); this association seems less pro-
nounced for positive urgency. For example, 
Berg et al. (2015) showed in a meta-analysis 
that urgency, and negative urgency in par-
ticular, correlates with various forms of psy-
chopathology, including problem gambling, 
substance abuse or mood disorders. No such 
strong or consistent correlations were found 
with other subscales or ‘subtraits’. Thus, the 
tendency to act rashly in response to nega-
tive emotional events seems a particularly 
prominent characteristic of many psycho-
pathologies. More generally, the findings 
of the meta-analysis are in line with other 
findings showing that dysregulated behav-
iors are often triggered by a negative emo-
tional event (Billieux, Gay, Rochat, & Van der 
Linden, 2010; Selby, Anestis, & Joiner, 2008).
Impulsivity does not only refer to traits, but 
also to specific states (i.e. short-term and tran-
sient changes in behavior). At a state level, 
often a further distinction is made between 
impulsive choice and impulsive action (Bari 
& Robbins, 2013; van Gaalen, Brueggeman, 
Bronius, Schoffelmeer, & Vanderschuren, 
2006; van Gaalen, van Koten, Schoffelmeer, 
& Vanderschuren, 2006). First, a choice is 
considered to be impulsive when people 
choose a small immediate reward over a 
larger delayed one (but see e.g. Dalley and 
Robbins, 2017, for more fine-grained distinc-
tions). Traditionally, this behavior is meas-
ured with a delay discounting task, in which 
participants need to choose between hypo-
thetical immediate small monetary rewards 
(e.g. 10 euro now) and delayed larger ones 
(e.g. 15 euro in a month; Kirby & Marakovic, 
1996). Second, an action is considered to be 
impulsive when it is executed without much 
forethought. Traditionally, impulsive actions 
are measured in response-inhibition tasks (at 
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least in humans; see below). Generally, corre-
lational and neuroscience research indicates 
that impulsive actions should be dissociated 
from impulsive choice (e.g. distinct neuro-
transmitter systems are involved in impul-
sive choice and impulsive actions, see Bari & 
Robbins, 2013 for an overview).
Here we focus on the origin and control 
of impulsive actions at a behavioral level. 
Textbox 1 describes an example of impul-
sive action in daily life, and most readers can 
presumably think of other examples from 
their own past or imagine situations in which 
they may act impulsively. Yet, how exactly 
specific impulsive actions originate has been 
rarely studied in a systematic fashion. Work 
discussed above on impulsive traits suggests 
that negative urgency correlates with many 
behavioral problems. Thus, negative emo-
tional events seem an important contributor 
to impulsive acts, which is why this will be a 
central focus of the review.
The origin of impulsive actions
A traditional measurement of impulsive 
action: response inhibition and prepotency
In the cognitive, psychiatric, and neuro-
science literature, ‘impulsive action’ is 
typically associated with the inhibition of 
well-practiced and prepotent responses (Bari 
& Robbins, 2013; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 
2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). This ability 
to inhibit responses is typically assessed in 
tasks such as the stop-signal task (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) 
or the go/no-go task (Donders, 1969), in 
which participants are instructed to execute 
a prepotent response on the majority of tri-
als but cancel it when an infrequent external 
stop- or no-go signal is presented. Only a few 
studies have systematically explored how 
prepotency (i.e. the strong tendency to act) 
develops.
In a developmental response-inhibition 
study, Simpson et al. (2012) presented images 
in a Stroop-like task. In this task, images were 
mapped onto a specific word. For example, 
when children saw an image of a car, they 
had to say ‘book’, or when they saw an image 
of a dog, they had to say ‘cat’. Simpson et al. 
found that response-set overlap (e.g. there 
were images of books and cars, and children 
had to say ‘book’ to car images, and ‘car’ to 
book images) resulted in longer response 
latencies and higher error rates, compared 
to a baseline condition without overlap, or 
a condition with semantic overlap (e.g. there 
were images of dogs and hands, but children 
had to say ‘cat’ to dog images and ‘foot’ to 
hand images). The latter conditions did not 
differ. This led the authors to conclude that 
responses became prepotent when children 
had the intention to produce them at some 
point (for related findings in younger and 
Textbox 1: Impulsive action in daily life.
Imagine a Monday morning. You are tired after a busy weekend and realize that you have a 
long day of meetings ahead of you. To make matters worse, your coffee machine does not 
seem to work. When you press the button, nothing happens. You try again. And again… And
again… Eventually you snap and smash the machine. Due to a lack of impulse control, no 
more coffee for today (if only you had checked whether the machine was plugged in). This is 
a good example of an impulsive action: it is executed without much forethought (i.e. 
smashing the machine does not solve the main problem), it occurred in response to a negative 
(emotional) event (no caffeine on a Monday morning), and has a sense of urgency.
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older children, see e.g. Verbruggen, McLaren, 
Pereg, & Meiran, 2018).
Methodological response-inhibition reviews 
(e.g. Verbruggen et al., 2019)  indicate that 
prepotency can also be induced via task 
instructions (‘respond as quickly as possible’) 
and certain design choices (e.g. presenting 
stop signals only on a minority of the trials, 
using a strict response deadline,…). For exam-
ple, in stop-signal tasks (one of the most pop-
ular paradigms to study response inhibition), 
subjects are typically instructed to respond 
as quickly as possible and not to wait for the 
infrequent stop signal; this is required to 
obtain reliable estimates of the covert latency 
of the stop process (see e.g. Verbruggen, 
Chambers, & Logan, 2013). When a response 
is prepotent, it becomes more difficult to 
inhibit. This link between prepotency and 
inhibition is formalized by the independent 
race model of Logan and colleagues (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, 
& Wagenmakers, 2014).
In sum, research on response inhibition 
suggests that prepotency can be created via 
task instructions and certain task character-
istics. However, most of this response-inhibi-
tion research used neutral stimuli (below we 
discuss a few exceptions) and external signals, 
so questions can be raised about the validity 
of the tasks. In particular, the personality and 
clinical research discussed above indicates 
that emotional or motivationally salient 
events are an important trigger of impulsive 
behaviors. Thus, standard response-inhibi-
tion tasks may not reveal much about the 
origins of impulsive action in non-laboratory 
settings (although it should be noted that 
some studies did find correlations between 
the urgency subscale of the UPPS and behav-
ioral performance in response-inhibition 
tasks; Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2012; Gay, 
Rochat, Billieux, d’Acremont, & Van der 
Linden, 2008; Wilbertz et al., 2014).
The emotional origin of impulsive action
In this review we will refer to ‘emotions’ 
in sense that Frijda (2010) defined them. 
One of the defining features of emotions 
according to Frijda (2010), is that they lead 
to actions. This happens in different steps. 
First, events would be ‘appraised’ by the indi-
vidual. Appraisal in this case means that the 
individual makes a fast judgement of the 
situation based on previous experiences and 
representations; and as a result, the event 
becomes ‘emotional’ and thus meaningful to 
the individual. Second, the appraised emo-
tional events form a state of ‘action readi-
ness’, which is a state to establish, change 
or sustain the individual’s relation to the 
event. Such states might induce an action 
in order to achieve one of two aims, namely 
approaching a desired state or avoiding an 
unwanted one. Third, the imbalance between 
the current and the desired state will elicit 
arousal, producing an autonomic response 
(such as changes in heart rate, ‘frowning 
response’ over facial muscles, skin conduct-
ance or pupillary response). The autonomic 
responses are displayed in anticipation and 
preparation of the possible actions, and 
might eventually trigger them to change the 
current goal state. In other words, in Frijda’s 
framework, ‘degree of arousal’ corresponds to 
the mobilization of resources and leads to a 
‘sense of urgency’. This also implies that emo-
tional events have two different dimensions: 
On the one hand the valence (positive or neg-
ative) and on the other hand the arousal they 
evoke (activation vs. deactivation). The idea 
that emotional events can be accounted for 
by two comparable orthogonal dimensions 
can be found in several other theories as well 
(Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015; Russell & 
Barrett, 1999; Saunders & Inzlicht, 2015).
Frijda’s (2010) main ideas received sup-
port from several lines of evidence. For 
example, facial electromyography (EMG) 
has been used to investigate how an event 
becomes appraised. In many studies, acti-
vation of the corrugator supercilii (mus-
cle involved in frowning) has been related 
to the processing of negative stimuli and 
emotions, whereas activation of the zygo-
matic muscle (muscle involved in laugh-
ing and smiling) has been mostly related 
to the processing of positive stimuli and 
emotions (e.g. Mauss & Robinson, 2009). 
These strong associations have been used 
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to determine how certain events are emo-
tionally appraised (although one should of 
course be aware of potential reverse infer-
ence problems; see e.g. Poldrack, 2006, 
for a related discussion). For example, Wu, 
van Dijk and Clark (2015) measured in a 
gambling task self-perceived luck, betting 
behavior, and facial muscle reactivity over 
the zygomaticus and the corrugator. Activity 
of the zygomaticus (the ‘smiling muscle’) 
did not systematically correlate with spe-
cific events in their task. However, activity 
of the corrugator (the ‘frowning muscle’) 
increased with losses, which led the authors 
to conclude that losses are appraised as 
(intense) emotional events. As discussed in 
more detail below, errors in simple choice-
discrimination tasks have a similar effect on 
corrugator activity (Elkins-Brown, Saunders, 
& Inzlicht, 2016; Lindström, Mattsson-Mårn, 
Golkar, & Olsson, 2013).
The idea that emotional stimuli or events 
lead to action readiness received support 
from transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) studies. When a brief TMS pulse is 
applied to the primary motor cortex, TMS 
causes contralateral muscular responses 
(motor evoked potentials; MEPs). These 
responses can be quantified using surface 
electromyography and provide a measure 
of corticospinal excitability (see e. g. Hallett, 
2007). Several studies observed that MEP 
amplitude was higher when emotional stim-
uli were presented compared with neutral 
control stimuli (Baumgartner, Willi, & Jäncke, 
2007; Hajcak et al., 2007), suggesting a direct 
effect of the emotional stimuli on the motor 
system. Furthermore, Schutter, Hofman, and 
Van Honk (2008) observed that negative 
emotional stimuli such as faces with fearful 
expressions had the most pronounced effect 
on MEP amplitudes compared to happy faces. 
Similarly, van Loon, van den Wildenberg, van 
Stegeren, Ridderinkhof and Hajcak (2010) 
found that task-irrelevant negative stimuli 
revealed largest MEP amplitudes compared 
to non-emotional stimuli or positive stimuli. 
Taken together, these TMS studies suggest 
that emotions (especially negative ones) lead 
to a state of action readiness.
May distinct ‘emotions’ lead to impulsivity?
So far, we have argued that impulsive actions 
are triggered by negative (appraised) events 
in general. Yet, some negative events might 
be more likely to trigger impulsive actions 
than others. In particular, it seems that 
impulsive actions are preferentially pro-
moted by negative events associated with 
failure, frustration or regret.
Carver (2006) elaborated on the specific 
role of emotions on action or invigoration 
of behavior. According to Carver’s (2006) 
theoretical framework, behavior is driven 
by a goal and the fact that individuals aim 
to approach this goal while simultaneously 
avoid what he calls the “anti-goal” (i.e. a not-
desired state). To reach the desired goal, dif-
ferent steps towards the goal are taken and a 
constant action-feedback loop compares the 
distance between the current state and the 
desired goal. Thus, individuals are continu-
ously evaluating how well they are doing in 
approaching the goal and avoiding the anti-
goal. This sensed rate of progress is compared 
by a ‘meta-monitoring’ loop to a criterion or 
standard (i.e. ‘the acceptable or desired rate 
of behavioral discrepancy reduction’; Carver 
& Scheier, 1990), which can subsequently 
lead to emotions: When the sensed rate 
of progress is the same as the criterion, no 
emotion arises (i.e. affect is neutral); when 
the sensed rate of progress is above the cri-
terion, a positive emotion arises; and when 
the sensed rate of progress is below the 
criterion, a negative emotion arises. In this 
context, experiencing negative emotions 
becomes a cue to increase effort (to close the 
gap), whereas experiencing positive emo-
tions can indicate that effort can be reduced 
(as the goal is (nearly) reached). Note that 
the action-feedback loop in Carver’s frame-
work is similar to the comparison between 
current and desired state of action readiness 
in Frijda’s (2010) framework. However, affect 
arises from the meta-feedback loop (monitor-
ing rate of progress, rather than discrepancy 
per se) in Carver’s framework. Furthermore, 
Carver (2006) argues that not every negative 
emotion is equivalent in terms of increased 
task engagement. For example, negative 
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emotions, such as being ‘sad’, might signal 
that there was too much engagement and 
that these would lead to decreased engage-
ment. By contrast, negative emotions such 
as frustration or regret might be associated 
with increased task engagement.
Consistent with the idea that negative 
emotions such as ‘frustration’ (i.e. a  negative 
affective state that is induced by a failure 
to obtain an incentive or the blockage of a 
desired goal) or regret (i.e. the realization 
that another choice would have produced a 
better outcome, which may be a  cognitive 
form of frustration; Reid, 1986) can invig-
orate behavior, a recent study observed 
faster responses after losses in a gambling 
task (Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence, & 
McLaren, 2017). In this gambling task, partic-
ipants could either choose a non-gambling 
option (a guaranteed amount of points) or 
choose a gambling option (the amount was 
always higher than the amount associated 
with the non-gamble, but the probability of 
winning was always lower). In all experiments 
of the study, the initiation of the next trial 
was faster after a gambled loss compared to 
the non-gamble baseline or a gambled win.1 
This finding was even enlarged in trials with 
high losses compared to low losses. Thus, it 
seems that losses, which were subjectively 
rated as negative emotional events (consist-
ent with Wu et al., 2015), can lead to invigor-
ated (‘impulsive’) actions as indicated by the 
relatively fast initiation of the subsequent 
trial. Similarly, Yu, Mobbs, Seymour, Rowe 
and Calder (2014) found that participants 
who did not receive an anticipated reward 
(i.e. the reward delivery was ‘blocked’) rated 
frustration levels higher and pressed the 
response key with more force than partici-
pants who did receive a reward (see also the 
seminal work on frustration by Amsel, 1958). 
Furthermore, these differences in Yu et al. 
(2014) were pronounced when the blocked 
reward was higher. Finally, the idea that non-
reward or losses might lead to impulsive 
behaviors is further supported by a study of 
Gipson et al. (2012), investigating the link 
between ‘negative urgency’ (as a trait) and 
frustrative non-reward. They demonstrated 
that participants scoring high on the nega-
tive urgency scale of the UPPS questionnaire 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) also reacted more 
‘impulsively’ to unexpected non-reward (by 
showing an increase in operant responding) 
than participants scoring low on the nega-
tive urgency scale. Combined, these findings 
suggest that a failure to obtain a reward may 
invigorate behavior and lead to different 
kinds of impulsive acts.
Taken together, the reviewed literature 
suggests that impulsive actions typically 
arise from emotional events, and in particu-
lar from failures to obtain a reward and/or an 
obstruction of goal pursuit. More specifically, 
impulsive actions seem to arise when the 
individual expects reward or tries to avoid an 
unrewarded or punished state. This will lead 
to an urge to act, which is connected to psy-
chophysiological activation (arousal). When 
such an urge arises, the first available action 
schema, a representation about the actual 
action that can be executed, is selected and 
executed even though it might be inappro-
priate to the situation (Evenden, 1999). This 
constitutes the simplest form of actions pro-
moted by emotions, i.e., ‘impulsive actions’ 
(Frijda, 2010).
Control of impulsive actions
So far, we described how negative emotion-
ally appraised events can induce impulsive 
action. However, not all emotional events 
will lead to impulsive action. Even though 
some evidence suggests that negative emo-
tions (and in particular, emotion-induced 
arousal) are linked to a decrease in impulse 
control (see below), impulses might still be 
overridden by alternative (‘non-impulsive’) 
actions or behaviors. For example, people 
may inhibit a prepotent response (e.g. in 
the coffee-machine example in Textbox 1, 
not hitting the machine when it is not work-
ing) and/or replace it with a different action 
(e.g. checking if the machine is plugged in). 
According to Frijda (2010), whether or not 
an impulsive action is executed, cancelled, or 
replaced with another action, depends on the 
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anticipated outcome of the action and the 
information about the stimulus and situation 
(e.g. the coffee machine is always unplugged 
during the weekend). But how this ‘overrid-
ing process’ would work remains unclear in 
Frijda’s (2010) framework. This crucial con-
trol issue is addressed in the next sections.
Distinct ways to control actions
Different ways to control (impulsive) actions 
have been proposed, but as mentioned 
above, the dominant idea in the control lit-
erature2 is that impulsivity is a consequence 
of a failure to inhibit or suppress inappro-
priate actions or response tendencies (Bari 
& Robbins, 2013; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 
2011; Hamilton et al., 2015; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008). However, stopping all behav-
ioral responses is an extreme case of control 
(Logan, 1994), which might not always be 
entirely functional. For example, some TMS 
work indicates that response inhibition can 
have global effects on the motor system, 
even affecting task-irrelevant effectors (e.g. 
Badry et al., 2009). Global inhibition can also 
have profound after-effects, which again, 
may or may not be functional. Thus, some 
situations might require more subtle forms 
of control when selecting between different 
response options or action tendencies. More 
generally, questions can be raised regarding 
the validity of popular response-inhibition 
tasks (especially when neutral go stimuli and 
external stop signals are used; e.g. Diamond, 
2013; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & 
Brass, 2014), and the extent to which a lack 
of inhibition of prepotent responses and 
impulsivity should be equated (Nigg, 2017; 
see also Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 
2014, for a critical analysis of action-control 
tasks). Thus, it is important to move beyond 
the sole response-inhibition construct in 
order to determine how impulsive actions 
are controlled in a variety of situations.
A first alternative type of impulse-control is 
directly connected to the origin of impulsive 
actions. Frijda, Ridderinkhof and Rietveld 
(2014) proposed that events can induce 
two (or more) conflicting states of action 
readiness (see e.g. also Cisek & Kalaska, 2010, 
who also argued that multiple response 
options or action representations are acti-
vated before a single one is selected and 
executed). Such competing states of action 
readiness may cancel each other out, result-
ing in reduced or absent overt actions. This 
kind of control is considered to be an inher-
ent property to the action system, and does 
not involve extra ‘top-down’ processes. Note 
though that these action-readiness conflicts 
may still lead to impulsive behavior, when 
the competition does not succeed in ‘damp-
ening’ of the action tendencies (Frijda et al., 
2014) and the first available action schema 
becomes selected.
Another possible way to control actions 
involves biasing this action-tendency con-
flict or competition within a trial (Frijda et 
al., 2014). This may involve biasing task-rele-
vant information (e.g. via task units or goals; 
Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) and 
suppression of task-irrelevant information 
or responses. The latter idea is supported by 
distributional analyses of performance data 
in tasks such as the Simon task (in which par-
ticipants respond with left/right responses 
to a feature of stimulus that is presented on 
the left or right of the screen). For example, 
Ridderinkhof (2002) found that response-
compatibility or interference effects were 
smaller for slower responses (and could even 
reverse; i.e. ‘faster’ responses on incongru-
ent trials compared with congruent trials). 
He attributed this pattern to the selective 
suppression of response activation result-
ing from task-irrelevant information (i.e. the 
location in a Simon task). However, this selec-
tive suppression takes some time to build up 
(hence the decrease over time).
The different control mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive, and conflict might be 
resolved in different (complementary) ways. 
Indeed, Wiecki and Frank (2013) proposed 
that three pathways are involved when 
executing a response in a conflict situa-
tion. There is a striatal Go pathway, which 
selectively facilitates a response, a striatal 
NoGo pathway, which suppresses prepotent 
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responses, and the hyperdirect pathway, 
which suppresses globally all responses and 
regulates the gating threshold of a response. 
This hyperdirect pathway is activated when 
conflict is detected. When all possible 
responses are suppressed, and thus slowed 
down, the conflict can be solved and the cor-
rect response can be selected. Thus, in Wiecki 
and Frank’s model there can be both a sup-
pression of a prepotent response and a gen-
eral suppression of all responses to resolve 
conflict within a trial.
So far, we only discussed within-trial adjust-
ments. But adjustments can also be made 
across trials. For example, many psychologi-
cal theories (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 
1977) assume that a cognitive control system 
further alters or biases the settings of lower-
level systems when people make an error, 
when conflict is detected, or more generally, 
when outcomes are suboptimal. For example, 
people often slow down after they make an 
error (‘post-error slowing’). Such slowing has 
been observed in many cognitive tasks (includ-
ing simple two choice reaction time tasks, 
conflict tasks such as the Flanker and Simon 
tasks, or response-inhibition tasks such as the 
stop-signal task), and is usually attributed to 
performance-related adjustments in task-rele-
vant processing pathways. Such adjustments 
usually increase response latencies (i.e. people 
become more cautious) and may reduce the 
likelihood of further errors or further improve 
task performance in subsequent trials (Dutilh 
et al., 2012, for further reading on between 
trial adaptation see also Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014).
Emotional foundations of impulse control
Recent evidence suggests that emotional 
states might also constitute an integral part of 
the cognitive-control and performance-adjust-
ments processes (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; 
Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013; Riesel, Weinberg, 
Endrass, Kathmann, & Hajcak, 2012; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). In 
other words, emotions might play a pivotal 
role not only in the origin but also in the con-
trol of (impulsive) action.
Several studies have focused on the causal 
role of emotions in response-inhibition tasks 
or other related impulse-control paradigms 
(e. g. Rebetez, Rochat, Billieux, Gay, & Van der 
Linden, 2015; Schulz et al., 2007; Verbruggen 
& De Houwer, 2007). These studies indicate 
that emotional arousal in particular can have 
a major impact on response inhibition (i.e. 
the first control type described in the previ-
ous section). For example, Verbruggen and 
de Houwer (2007) used a stop-signal task 
and presented emotional pictures before the 
actual task stimuli. In a first experiment, they 
found that both positive and negative emo-
tional pictures impaired go and stop perfor-
mance (i.e. both go and stop latencies were 
prolonged when emotional pictures were 
presented, compared with neutral images). A 
second experiment showed that high-arousal 
pictures impaired the performance more 
than low-arousal pictures. Valence had only 
little effect in these experiments. This led 
Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007) to con-
clude that emotionally arousing pictures are 
distracting, generally impairing performance 
in the stop-signal task. Similarly, De Houwer 
and Tibboel (2010), found impaired perfor-
mance in a go/no-go task (another popular 
response-inhibition task) after arousing pic-
tures. They also did not find a significant effect 
of valence (although their data showed that 
the effect of arousal was numerically stronger 
for negative compared to positive pictures). 
Pessoa (2009) suggested that emotions might 
influence executive control processes in two 
different ways corresponding to either ‘percep-
tual’ or ‘executive’ processing. First, emotional 
content enhances perceptual processing of 
stimuli. This would lead to task improvements 
when low-threat emotional stimuli are task 
relevant (e.g. Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, & Bauer, 
2012), but impairments when these are task-
irrelevant. Second, Pessoa (2009) proposes 
that high-treat or high-arousal stimuli will 
also require ‘attentional’ or ‘effortful’ control. 
As executive control capacity is assumed to be 
limited in Pessoa’s framework, such ‘executive’ 
processing of emotional (threatening) stimuli 
would impair executive or cognitive processes, 
such as response inhibition.
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There is evidence that information biasing 
or adjustments of task settings are also influ-
enced by emotional stimuli. Van Steenbergen 
et al. (2009) presented random monetary 
gains or losses as feedback in a Flanker task, 
and found that the random gains after a con-
flict trial (leading to a positive mood) reduced 
subsequent conflict adaptation. By contrast, 
negative emotion seemed to increase conflict 
adaptation (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012) and 
post−error slowing was enlarged when errors 
were punished, leading to a more negative 
mood state (Riesel et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Fritz & Dreisbach (2013) found that neutral 
stimuli following an incongruent Stroop 
trial (in which target and distractor required 
different responses) were judged as more 
negative than neutral stimuli following a 
non-conflict trial (in which target and dis-
tractor required the same response). Finally, 
psychophysiological studies using facial EMG 
found that the degree of corrugator supercilii 
activation (see above) in response to an error 
correlated positively with post−error slowing 
(Lindström et al., 2013; Saunders & Inzlicht, 
2015). Based on these and other related find-
ings (e.g. Braem et al., 2017), it has been 
argued that conflict and errors elicit negative 
emotion, which acts as a trigger for subse-
quent cognitive control adjustments.
Towards an integration
Conflict and performance-adjustment studies 
have shown that the experience of negative 
emotions or the confrontation with negatively 
valenced stimuli can increase cognitive con-
trol (or potentially promote a proactive mode 
of information processing) under at least some 
circumstances. In the framework of Carver 
(2006) and Frijda (2010), this might be func-
tional because increased control can help to 
narrow the gap between the current state and 
the desired state. But as discussed in the previ-
ous sections, there is also a corpus of evidence 
suggesting that negative (emotional) events 
can promote impulsive behavior (Dyson, 
Sundvall, Forder, & Douglas, 2018; Verbruggen 
et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2014). Saunders and 
Inzlicht (2015) proposed the shifting priorities 
model to explain how a negative event such as 
an error or failure may result in distinct after-
effects. According to these authors, a desire for 
gratification will emerge and the individual 
will try to return to ‘cognitive comfort’ (i.e. a 
state which is characterized by an acceptable 
(and thus low) level of negative emotion) when 
they experience a prolonged period of unre-
warded control processes. Thus, Saunders and 
Inzlicht’s model also starts from a discrepancy 
between the current state (e.g. having no cof-
fee) and a desired state (e.g. drinking coffee). 
Importantly, however, the best strategy to re-
gain cognitive comfort would differ according 
to contextual and environmental factors. For 
example, after an error in a controllable deci-
sion task, individuals might increase cognitive 
control in an attempt to achieve cognitive 
comfort. In contrast, when individuals have 
no control, they might experience fatigue 
and hence, generally decrease cognitive con-
trol. This can result in less effort (or even no 
behavior) when the individuals perceive the 
problem as exceeding their own abilities or as 
unsolvable (Gendolla, Abele, & Krüsken, 2001; 
Mikulincer, 1988). Uncontrollable situations 
may even lead to more ‘impulsive’ behavior 
(as we have seen above). Thus, Saunders and 
Inzlicht (2015) suggested that vigor or fatigue 
at a control level are dependent on the task 
context.
The ‘controllability’ idea recently received 
support from Dyson et al. (2018). Using a 
rock, paper, scissor game, these authors tested 
whether predictability (i.e. can strategies be 
applied or not?) influenced impulsive actions 
after negative outcomes. In the standard 
unpredictable condition (in which partici-
pants could not derive the strategy used by 
the other player), Dyson et al. (2018) observed 
shorter response latencies after a loss than 
after a win. This is consistent with the find-
ings of Verbruggen et al. (2017). Importantly, 
the reversed effect (i.e. longer latencies after a 
loss than after a win) was observed when the 
opponent’s strategy was predictable and par-
ticipants could apply a strategy themselves. 
Similarly, this can be observed with errors 
on trial-by-trial basis. Damaso, Williams and 
Heathcote (in press) found that the type of 
error determined whether participants slowed 
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down or not after an error. When errors 
resulted from responding too quickly (favor-
ing speed over accuracy), post-error slow-
ing was observed. However, when the errors 
resulted from poor stimulus quality, no post-
error slowing was observed. Indeed, it could be 
argued that there is no point in slowing down 
when the evidence quality remains the same 
over time. Thus, these findings suggest that 
slowing depends on the task characteristics.
Sone findings even suggest that general 
beliefs can influence control adjustments. 
For example, Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass and Burle 
(2013) identified an influence of perceived 
control on post−error slowing. In this between-
subject study, they manipulated the belief in 
free will, after which participants performed 
a Simon task. The authors found reduced 
post−error slowing in the group with reduced 
belief in free will. Furthermore, a follow-up 
study showed that such beliefs modulated 
ERPs typically associated with error monitor-
ing (Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass, 2015). Thus, it 
seems that the response to a negative event 
such as an error or a loss might be modulated 
by the perceived control of the participants.
Conclusions
As reflected in recent reviews, most clinical, 
cognitive, neuroscience, and animal stud-
ies on impulsive action have examined how 
humans and non-human animals can stop or 
withhold a prepotent action in response to 
an external signal (i.e. response inhibition). 
This research has led researchers to pro-
pose that response inhibition may serve as 
an endophenotype for impulsive action, 
arguing that variation in the effectiveness 
of inhibitory control underlie impulsive 
behaviors in the real world. However, the 
hitherto strong focus on externally-triggered 
response inhibition has resulted in narrow 
views of impulse control.
In this critical review, we elaborated on 
how impulsive actions originate and how 
these can be controlled in different ways. We 
focused in particular on the role of negative 
events. We discussed how events are con-
stantly appraised, and how discrepancies 
between current and desired goals or states 
can induce action tendencies or changes in 
response strategies and control settings. In 
this view, impulsive actions are ‘emotional’ 
actions. We also described different control 
processes that can be engaged in different 
situations: global suppression of all actions 
(as studies in traditional response-inhibition 
tasks), direct competition between differ-
ent states of action readiness, and biasing of 
task-relevant information. There is evidence 
that these control processes can also be 
influenced by distinct emotions or moods. 
Whether or not emotion would enhance or 
impair impulse control might depend on 
the task or context (e.g. controllability of 
the task) and whether or not the emotional 
events are task-relevant or not. Thus, as sum-
marized in Figure 1, both the origin and 
Figure 1: Summary of the main theoretical accounts of impulsive action. All theories assume 
that the comparison between the current state and the desired state (e.g. cognitive com-
fort) leads to actions. However, the theories assume different reasons for an action being 
invigorated or not.
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Textbox 2: Key outstanding theoretical questions.
Research on trait impulsivity suggests that negative emotions can lead to impulsive actions in 
everyday life. However, this critical review indicates there are still several open questions. 
Here we highlight three questions that deserve particular attention.
What is the emotional response to suboptimal behavioral outcomes, and what role do
emotional arousal play?
Negative emotional events have been associated with impulsivity and restraint. According to 
some authors (see main text),distinct negative emotional events might lead to distinct 
outcomes. A rousal may also play a critical role. It is therefore essential to study the nature of 
the ‘emotional’ response and the behavior after non-reward to understand how actions 
become invigorated. 
How do internal beliefs influence the emotional response after a negative outcome?
An event becomes ‘emotional’ as soon as it is appraised by the individual. Nevertheless, the 
emotionaland behavioral response might depend on whether the participants feel responsible 
for the outcome or not (Koban & Pourtois, 2014) , even though the event itself remains the 
same. Frijda (2010) also argued that the process of appraisal might be influenced by 
individual experiences and different beliefs.This link between internal beliefs and the origin 
and control of impulsive action still has to be explored though.
What are the mechanisms underlying the effect of post-loss speeding?
Failures to obtain a reward can induce frustration and invigorate subsequent behavior.
However, in previous research, ‘frustration’ referred both to the effect (i.e. increased response 
vigor or impulsivity) and the cause, and a mechanistic account is missing. Therefore, future 
research is required to explore (at a mechanistic level) how non-reward induces changes in 
the motor system.
the control of impulsive actions seem to be 
closely linked to negative (emotional) events, 
in particular the difference between a cur-
rent state and a desired state, which in turn 
depends also on other circumstances such 
as the perceived control. Further outstand-
ing theoretical questions are highlighted in 
Textbox 2.
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Notes
 1 Note, that we recently were able to 
 replicate these results in a short pilot 
experiment. Raw data can be found on 
OSF (osf.io/7xbth).
 2 For a discussion of the (sometimes  subtle) 
differences between executive control, 
self-control and similar concepts, see 
Nigg (2017).
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